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We háve chosen a different order of these three leaders of the First Czechoslo-
vak Republic than the current one. To this day it is widely held that the first 
place in the history of that country belongs to Masaryk, the uncrowned king of 
the statě, the second to his lieutenant and heir-apparent, Beneš, while Švehla, if 
at all, is mentioned on the third place as the perennial, dexterous prime minister 
during the first decade of the new statě. 
Our order departs from this tradition. The criterion we háve ušed ist the active 
role each of these men took in actually determining the character of internal and 
external polky. According to the well-considered view of the leading authority 
on the first decade of that country, Ferdinand Peroutka, a protégé of Masaryk 
and the spokesman of the moderate wing of the Castle group, it is Švehla, rather 
than Masaryk, the father of the country, who should be regarded as the builder 
of the statě and architect of Czechoslovak democracy. Five years after Svehla's 
death, in December 1938, the author of the Budování státu (Building of the 
State) l , in an article entitled „Svehla's Tradition", published in his weekly, Pří­
tomnost, wrote: „The title of the architect of the statě belongs in this country to 
him rather than to anybody eise. Others made themselves famous by liberating 
the country, and forged ahead in populär imagination. In fact, however, once the 
statě stood on its feet, Svehla's magnetic will slowly made itself felt. Let us not 
be mistaken. The character of our political life was determined more by the will 
of Švehla than by that of Masaryk. I t was our luck that he had a genius in devi-
sing methods of constructive statesmanship2." To similar conclusion came a 
British authority on Czechoslovak politics, writing in his obituary on Švehla: 
1
 P e r o u t k a , Ferdinand: Budování státu; československá politika v letech popřevra-
tových [Building of the State; Czechoslovak Politics in the First Post war Years]. 
5 vols. in 6. Prague 1934—36. This work could háve been called history of our times 
or birth of a democracy. Its author is not a professional historian, but a leading Czech 
Journalist. In well over 200 chapters or essays and on mearly 3000 pages he teils a 
vivid story of the first three years of the republic. Based as it is, particularly regarding 
Masaryk and Švehla on information given to the author by Masaryk's confidential 
friend, Rudolf Bechyně, it is an unique source of information about the relationship of 
these two men. An intimate knowledge of all important people and of countless events 
and developments of the first years of the country enabled the author to lay definite 
foundations of the first steps of the new statě. The author belonged to the moderate 
wing of the Castle group, and is therefore mildly biased in favor of Masaryk and 
Beneš. Yet we owe to him more than to anybody eise most of our information re­
garding Masaryk's antipode, Švehla. For some reason the book has no index, and 
unless the reader is willing to make one for himself, he cannot make füll use of it. 
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 Švehlova tradice [Svehla's Tradition]. Přítomnost, December 14, 1938. 
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„For the first ten years the real master of Czech politics was the latě Antonín 
Švehla, the leader of the powerful agrarian or peasant party . . . His share in brin-
ging the Czechoslovak statě into being was at least as great as that of his more 
widely known compatriots, professor Masaryk and dr. Beneš 3 . " 
Peroutka did not discover Švehla only five years after his and one year after 
Masaryk's death. H e came out with the same story, presenting for the first time 
to his people a sympathetic portrait of their little known, by that time accomplis-
hed statesman, in an article entitled „A Taciturn Statesman", published in Pří­
tomnost in 1926. In that article he had summarized Svehla's main achievements 
from the first years of the country, produced a profile of this more or less my-
sterious person, who unlike all other leaders was stubbornly shunning publicity, 
spoke about his philosophy and concluded that „nobody's role in building the 
statě is eaqual to Svehla's. H e is the man in power and he prudently leads the 
country from one goal to another. He planned things years ahead, and was able 
to fullfil his plans." 
Peroutka was not alone to recognize Svehla's genius. His role in the Czech 
camp during the turbulent war years was described by František Soukup, a so­
cial democrat, in his work, October 28,1918. 
„The name of Antonín Švehla evokes in our mind the history of this country 
in the most frightful years of the World War, in the most responsible days of 
the national revolution, and as the young statě was rising to a new life. Antonín 
Švehla was always the great concentric power of the nation. All the forces of the 
national resistance and then of national revolution grouped around him. And this 
astonishing concentric power was active in the republic as well as in the revolu­
tion. The chief of the revolutionary generál staff became the chief of coalition 
governments of the republic 4 ." 
There is an interesting testimony about the relationship between Švehla and 
Masaryk. We owe it to the well-known confidential friend of Masaryk, the so-
cial-democratic member of the Committee of Five, Rudolf Bechyně: 
„Antonín Švehla was doing his work not under Masaryk, but side by side with 
him. He has taught us the art of government. Where did he learn himself that 
art? H e had learnt it in the same way as a bird learns to fly or a tree to bloom. 
If we attempt to simplify important historical events in a sentence, we would say 
that to Thomas G. Masaryk we owe our existence as an independent statě, while 
Antonín Švehla under the aegis of the moral authority of the Liberator laid down 
the foundations of a political order, of an orderly government and of a living 
political tradition 5 ." 
Similar view was expressed by Jaroslav Stránský, a national socialist, who 
according to Bechyně ušed to criticize Švehla most often and most emphatically, 
but during his exile years came to a different conclusion: 
„But for Švehla, the austrophile opportunists of the social democracy and 
3
 A Czech of the Czechs. Times, December 14, 1933. 
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 S o u k u p , František: 28. říjen 1918 [October 28, 1918]. 
5
 Listopad a prosinec 1935 v našem politickém životě [November and December in our 
Political Life]. Přítomnost, January 22, 1936. 
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their leader Šmeral, who later became a communist, would háve found among the 
agrarians their friends rather than opponents . . . Brisk, tenacious, energetic and 
patient, sensitive and witty, with his peasant background folksy, prudent, educa-
ted self-made man. If political liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks after the first 
World War was the work of Masaryk and Beneš, the resounding success in internal 
politics of the new statě, generally recognized, was first of all the work of 
ŠvehlaV 
There was no other political personality in the First Republic about which the 
leaders of all parties, his political and ideological rivals, had such a high opinion 
as Švehla. In the end even a communist spokesman recognized his greatness when 
in 1968 he wrote: „We can describe him as a man with clean hands, unsullied by 
the filth of political affairs and of corruption 7 ." 
In špite of these testimonies by leading personalities of different political camps, 
Švehla is normally in Czech and much more so in foreign historiography to this 
day overlooked and pushed into the background. The question is to what extent 
this is due to the natural bias of exiles, who in 1945 agreed or did not protest 
when the party which he had built and on whose support he depended, was ban-
ned, or merely to a conventional treatment of Czechoslovak history. That is the 
feeling one must háve, for example, on reading the closing chapter of Mamatey 
and Luzas's History of Czechoslovak Republik 1918—1948, which presents on 
13 pages a brief survey of Czechoslovak politics during the First Republic, men-
tioning a number of prominent people, but omitting Svehla's name. This, howe-
ver, might be merely a serious oversight, for Švehla is highly praised in the other 
chapters, though no attempt is made to point out some of his most important achiev-
ements. 
There is no room to Supplement this outline of the role of this man by descri-
bing his work beginning with his determining the strength each, of the parties 
should háve in parliament and in the cabinet before the first election in April 1920 
took place, and ending with the tribute made to him by the National Assembly 
when serious illness forced him to become an invalid, who nominally in the tenth 
year of the country's existence remained in power. It is enough to say that he had 
an unique talent to bring together, in an era torn by a social revolution, people 
of radically different opinions until in the end he succeeded to eradicate from 
Czechoslovak political life the slogan: either . . . or, common to both nationalists 
and their enemies socialists, and supplant it by his own: this . . . as well as that. 
The successful symbiosis of overweening Czech sozialism, both in its anti-commu-
nist, but still Marxist garb of social democracy, and in its national socialistic, non­
Marxist form, with the moderate Czech nationalism, spearheaded by Svehla's pea­
sant party in the first seven years of the republic, had no parallel in any European 
country. Supplemented with an equally successful symbiosis of moderate Czech 
and German nationalism, again under agrarian leadership, it had made Czecho-
6
 Politik velkých zásluh Antonín Švehla [A Politician of Great Deserts, Antonín Švehla]. 
České Slovo, December 1958. 
7
 U h l í ř , Dušan: Antonín Švehla, Dějiny a současnost [A. S., History and Our Ti­
mes]. November 1968. 
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slovakia an island of democracy in central Europe. The credit for these achieve-
ments should be given first of all to Švehla and his friends, who first appeared 
in an embryonic stage as „the men of October 28", then as the Red-Green coali-
tion, which, after the communist secession in 1920, was transformed first into the 
Committee of Five, to become in the end the committee of political ministers of 
the cabinets in power. This is what Masaryk may háve in mind when in 1928 he 
said that in his opinion Švehla was one of the greatest European statesmen8. By 
his taciturnity, patience and caution, resourcefulness and tenacity, willingness to 
compromise and diplomatic skill, this man reminds somehow of William the Si-
lent, the founder of the Dutch republic, described by G. M. Trevelyan as „the 
wisest, gentlest and bravest man that ever led a nation". 
In the face of this unchanging picture of Švehla we are today at a loss in dra-
wing a political profile of the two other leading Czechoslovak statesmen. There 
were times during the First Republic when both their names were pronounced 
by the same breath, and when any critical remark about either of them was re-
garded as an insult of the other, as well. Those days both in the exile and in the 
old country belong today to the past. Subconsciously rather than on purpose 
distinction is made between the two, often only by ceasing to praise on various 
occasions both of them. It was impossible to overlook the fact that Masaryk had 
died a year before „Munich", and it is by no means certain that he would háve 
allowed Beneš to lead the nation into the fatal isolation had he been alive. Much 
less can we imagine Masaryk in the exile throwing overboard his faith in the 
West, and joining the fate of his country with that of Soviet Russia, whose an-
choring in the West he would regard as the best safeguard of European peace. 
Neither did he ever dream of the birth of a people's democracy, spearheaded by 
Czechoslovakia and then transplanted to the other central European countries as 
well as to the West. Masaryk indeed gave his support to Beneš whenever he could, 
but we may doubt that even he was initiated into Benes's far-reaching plans. 
To obtain a clear picture of the Czechoslovak permanent foreign minister it is 
necessary to carefully analýze his prewar policy. We would then find that there 
were two kinds of Beneš. The first was a realist, a sober, sensible statesman of a 
small nation, who took place at the Paris Peace Conference, and thanks to his 
soberness — but also to the fact that by that time his country alone in central 
Europe appeared to preserve order and progress — reached there most of his 
objectives. H e then remained for a number of years a realist in directing his 
country's foreign policy, keeping well in mind the advice given to him by western 
friends to focus first of all on establishing friendly relations with his small and 
big neighbors, and doing all he could to help even his former enemies in their 
desperate economic Situation. He had some success in this respect, which had 
raised his reputation abroad. He was looked upon as a liberal statesman who 
was strong enough to disregard the criticism of Czech nationalists, as blind as 
were their counterparts abroad. Unfortunately he very soon became tired of this 
Č a p e k , Karel: President Masaryk o různých věcech [President Masaryk about 
various things]. Lidové noviny, April 8, 1928. 
12' 
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game, the chief reason being that since the mid-twenties the leading statesman of 
all Czech neighbors looked askance at his political theories in which his understan-
ding of the necessity to look for salvation in his own form of socialism played 
an important role. 
This predisposition, which had characterized him already before the war soon 
after the war led him to look forward to a positive, more friendly attitude to 
Soviet Russia than that which was prevalent in western Europe. H e sympathized 
with that country during the Russo-Polish war of 1920, agreed with the resistance 
of Czech communist railroad workers to transport munition across the country 
to help the Poles, and brought Masaryk, otherwise distrustful of Soviet Russia, to 
share his faith in the victory of the Russian arms 9 . Two years later, after the 
Germans and Russians had signed their Rapallo treaty, he saíled at füll sails into 
the Soviet waters. He signed with them a preliminary treaty „by which Czecho-
slovakia recognized de facto the Soviet government, and became in this way the 
first statě which established official contacts with that government 1 0". H e then 
by and by became more or less a silent partner of Moscow in its European politics, 
and later, when the Soviets joined the League of Nations, played the role of 
Stalin's impresario u . This friendship was then in 1935 sealed by the Czechoslo­
vak Soviet treaty. Here we háve already to deal with the second Beneš, in many 
ways the reverse of the cautious, sober statesman as he appeared in the first post-
war years. Tired by the on the whole meager results of the conciliatory policy 
toward his country's neighbors, the ambitious short man started to play a role in 
the League of Nations, and slowly steered his country towards what he believed 
to be its European mission, námely to become a bridge between Soviet Russia 
and the West 1 2. It should be understood that it was not hunger for power which 
9
 „Masaryk not only did consider the capture of Warsaw by the Bolshevik army a mat­
ter of certainty but he warned against organizing any military assistance to the Poles 
on the ground: It was certain to be completely ineffective in a military sense, and it 
was liable to destroy the authority of the Western Powers in the subsequent negotiations 
for peace." Lord ď A b e r n o n : The Diary of an Ambassador. London 1929, 
pp. 112—113. 
1 0
 Československá vlastivěda [A Study of Czechoslovakia]. Part II. History, Vol. 2. 
Prague 1969, p. 434. 
1 1
 „We entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1922 at the Con­
ference of Genoa and right up to 1938 we continually did our utmost to maintain a 
policy of friendly Cooperation, in špite of the strong Opposition of our right wing 
parties." B e n e š , E.: Paměti [Memoirs]. Prague 1947, p. 6. 
1 2
 „The outstanding diaracteristic of Czechoslovakia's policy towards Moscow was the 
desire to act as intermediary between Russia and other states. As early as 1920 when 
Lenin sent Krasin to Copenhagen, Beneš dispatched a telegram to Krasin offering to 
serve as middle man between the East and the West. Thereafter, in every possible 
circumstance Beneš persued the same tactics. He has on various occasions tried to 
mediate between Roumania or Poland or France on the one hand, and Russia on the 
other. He attempted it at the Genoa Conference, when Lloyd George said to Chicherin, 
,Who is Mr. Beneš?'. This was the Welshman's method of disassociating himself in a 
given instance from persons he knew quite well . . . " F i s c h e r , Louis: The Soviets 
in Foreign Affairs. New York 1930, p. 171. 
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drove him, but his sincere desire to point to western Europe the way to a brighter 
future. 
As he understood it, the world war by eliminating the European autocrats went 
only half of the way towards the Solution of the European problém. There still 
remained the unsolved social problém. It seemed to him that the depression years 
of the thirties created a Situation when this problém could be effectively tackled. 
He called the goal which he had in mind „the rule of the fourth estate". H e talked 
about this subject in Paris in 1932 on the occasion of one hundredth anniversary 
of the Academy of Moral and Social Sciences, suggesting to France to také a lead 
in this direction: 
„The bourgeoisie triumphed under the old regime. Between 1830 and 1890 
it dominated Europe. From 1848 on, however, she became confronted by the 
fourth estate, the influence of which is feit all over Europe . . . The fourth estate, 
modem mankind, puts to us and France, to all of us, the cardinal question: what 
is our goal today and what will bring tomorrow?" 
That he regarded the Solution of this problém as his own life-task may be judged 
from the fact that he did not hesitate to impute it — unjustly — to Masaryk 
when, in a speech over Masaryk's coffin, he said that Masaryk came to the con-
clusion that „the fourth estate will rise in every nation claiming more power and 
improvement of conditions". He devoted to this subject his lectures at the Uni­
versity of Chicago in 1939, which were subsequently published under the title, 
Democracy Today and Tomorrow and new national ideals and goals in this sense 
were the subject of every of his annual messages to the Council of State of the 
Czechoslovak exiles in London as well as of his broadcasts to his own people. 
His cardinal mistake was that while he was preaching his gospel he was at the 
same time meddling with the policy of the big powers. H e wanted to exercise in­
fluence on European problems, a task traditionally reserved to the great powers. 
On its first step into the European history Karel Havlíček, a prominent Czech 
Journalist, in 1848 warned his country from getting itself involved in dealings 
with a great power by coining a doggrel known by every Czech child: „Jack, don't 
go skating with the gentlemen. It often happens that a gentleman makes a slip, and 
the poor man breaks his leg. „Had he in the thirties followed the advice of his 
western friends to reach an agreement with the rebellious German minority rather 
than setting snares on Hitler, with the presumed collaboration of Stalin, he might 
not háve fallen in the end in the pit himself. An agreement with the German 
minority could however be made only by means of a bourgeois coalition in which 
Czechs, including Czech, but not German social democrats, would háve a com-
fortable majority. Asking Beneš, who was elected president by the Czech populär 
front, to give his consent to the formation of a bourgeois coalition, would háve 
been like asking Churchill to give his consent to the dismemberment of the British 
empire. The years of the first bourgeois coalition in 1926—1929 were the years 
when his political existence was at stake, the years of his shame. He was perhaps 
prepared to face a mild Munich rather than installing a bourgeois coalition, which 
would háve sullied his escutchen. 
In September 1938 there were three leading statesmen in Europe east of the 
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Rhine who were willing to wage a war. Each of them, of course, a different kind 
of war. Hitler was anxious to settle his affair with Czechoslovakia. H e was sure 
that France and England would not move, and he was also sure that Russia would 
not help her small ally. H e was gut of his humor in Munich, by no means pleased 
with his bloodless victory, bore a grudge against the two western powers, who 
did not allow him to wage his war, and a month after Munich gave his order 
for the annihilation of the mutilated Czechoslovakia. 
The war Stalin had in mind was different. As a good Marxist he was convinced 
that contradictions inside the capitalistic states regulary produce wars. He was 
looking forward to such a war, from which the Soviets would naturally in their 
own way profit, and was anxious to bring it about. He therefore welcomed 
Czechoslovakia's entanglement in European affairs involving France. At the 
same time he was aware of the physical and moral unpreparedness of both western 
powers to help that country in čase of a German aggression. Yet, like Beneš, who 
was sure of Russian assistance, he did not discount the possibility that in the end 
the western powers would stand by the small protégé of France. His Obligation 
to help being only secondary, he took no steps to prepare his country for this even­
tuality. Once the war started, he probably would have waited for its development 
before involving his country one way or another. In each čase he could plead the 
unwillingness of Poland and Roumania to allow Russian troops to come to help 
Czechoslovakia. In the end like Hitler, he too came off badly that time. 
The third disappointed person was dr. Beneš. By his policy, based on his faith 
that the western world was steadily moving towards the rule of the fourth estate, 
and on his conviction that his policy must follow his country's „European"mission, 
he brought his country into fatal isolation losing all its friends and supporters of 
yesterday. In the end he saw the only Solution in bringing about a war in which 
not only his own country, but also France and England would face Germany, and 
soon after that also Russia. He foresaw some such development for years, and 
during his visit in Russia at the time of the signatuře of his treaty in 1935, brought 
Stalin or rather thought he had brought him to share his view. From the moment 
Hitler came to power in Germany he more or less assumed the role of the generál 
secretary of an anti-fascist front. Such a front was indeed highly desirable, but he 
came with his idea too soon. He took the liberty to meddle with the business of 
big powers and believed that he can do so without Hitler's notice. H e would have 
been shocked had somebody then told him that his front would become a reality 
only on the day when Hitler invades Benes's presumed and his own real, true 
friend and admirer, Stalin. 
Regarding Stalin's relation to Hitler we have an interesting testimony by his 
daughter Světlana. She writes: „Even after the war was over he was in the hábit 
of repeating: ,Ech, together with the Germans we would have been invincible'1 3." 
That a man, a leader of the Soviet Russia, holding a similar view of Hitler even 
after the war, would have been inclined and willing to go against him before the 
1 3
 S v ě t l a n a , Alliluyeva: Only One Year. New York 1969, p. 392. 
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war for the sake of a small, distant, non-communist country is more than impro­
bable. Only a fool would believe this. After the testimony of his daughter, Stalin's 
falše pretenses to help Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich should be regarded 
as an example of a brilliant diplomatic hoax in modern history. Dr. Beneš knew 
Stalin very badly when he based his whole policy on the faith in his word and 
on his own understanding of the objectives of his policy. His partial excuse is 
that he was not alone among western politicians who regarded Stalin's behavior 
during the Munich crisis as blameless, and saw him at that time a knight sans peur 
et sans reproche. Many scholars in the West still regard him in that light. But he 
was the only European statesmen, who on account of Stalin's presumed loyalty 
in an evil hour become his vassal and joined the interests of his own country with 
the interests and aims of Russia. H e was therefore destined to enter into the Euro­
pean history as a gratuitous red Quisling, the only one of his kind, as well as the 
father of populär, or rather vulgär, democracy, which was meant as a bridge bet­
ween the East and West, but became instead everywhere only a communist anti-
chambre. Franz Borkenau, one of the leading kremlinologs, wrote about him: 
„Beneš, the Czech president, in sympathy with Russia owing to his pronounced 
Pan-Slav leanings, and probably the least insuspicious and least informed in the 
matter of communism of all Western leaders . . . 1 4." H e passed a judgment over 
himself at the end of his life in a letter to his war-time secretary, Eduard Táborský, 
saying: „My greatest mistake was that I refused to believe to the very last that 
even Stalin lied to me cynically both in 1935 and later, and that his assurances to 
me and to Masaryk were an intentional deceit1 5." Such was the end of his twenty 
five years of unrequited love of the Soviets. 
There were also two Masaryks, but, unlike his successor, they were both made 
of the same stuff. First let us také up Masaryk, the president. 
Robert W. Seton-Watson wrote about a close and harmonius partnership bet­
ween Masaryk and Beneš and compared it to the relation between the emperor 
Francis and Metternich1 6. Most Czechs, indeed, little as they had to base theif 
judgment on, would have agreed with the view that Beneš was carrying on his 
policy under the philosophical, moral and political aegis of Masaryk. After what 
happened after the death of Masaryk, we may be allowed to have our doubts. 
Beneš never lost the confidence of the president, but in their relationship it was 
he who was the active agent and set the pace ". Jaromír Smutný, head of the 
president's office in exile, author of: Dokumenty k historii československé zahra­
niční politiky 1939—1943 (Documents on the History of Czechoslovak Foreign 
Policy 1939—1943), a sort of president's Boswell, broke the ice by writing that 
14
 B o r k e n a u , Franz: European Communism. London 1951, p.278. 
1 5
 T á b o r s k ý , Edvard: Beneš and Stalin — Moscow 1943 and 1945. JCEA (July 1953). 
1 6
 S e t o n - W a t s o n , Robert W.: History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London 1943, 
p. 341. 
1 7
 There is little evidence to support the view of Piotr S. Wandycz that until the early 
1930's Benes's foreign policy was formed largely under Masaryk's guidance. M a ­
m a t e y , Victor S. / L u ž a, Radomír (eds.): A history of the Czechoslovak Republik 
1918—1948. Princeton 1973, p. 216 (notě). 
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„The movement abroad during the first World War was in fact led by Beneš, 
Masaryk being only the spirituál head — which is the main thing . . . 1 8." 
Masaryk indeed was not what is called a born politician. His great love always 
were books, study of man and society, contemplation of eternal truths, and the 
Solution of great cultural tasks of our time. He had a low opinion of day to day 
politics of which he had some experience in the early nineties1 9, and the great 
days of his influence before the war took place when he stood alone against the 
dominant moods of his people. Had he been a politician before the war, with his 
intelligence and energy he would have created something more imposing than a 
party which, at its best, was able to send only two men to the Austrian Reichs­
rat. The disappearance of that party in 1917, at the moment when the nation 
was learning about his work abroad, proves that his followers had lost faith in 
the attractiveness of his prewar slogans, and were looking for something which 
would be more populär. 
He did not renew his party after the war. Even if he were inclined to do so 
— which may be doubted — his presidential duties were foremost in his mind. 
Now and then he intervened into the day to day politics, most often probably 
prompted by Beneš and his Castle group, but as a rule he was cautious in the 
selection of words. In his talks with Karel Čapek he said more than once he was 
wrong before the war in his political views. H e was wrong now and then also 
after the war, but with the exception of his incomprehensible steady support of 
Beneš, none of his mistakes should be regarded as cardinal. For, unlike Beneš, 
he was not devoid of self-criticism. He was often obstinate, but he also knew how 
to listen to reason. Unlike Beneš, in whose eyes Švehla was a mountebank (Do­
kumenty, No. 117), he admired Švehla and personally liked him, though it may 
be doubted whether he understood his genius. Had that been the čase, he would 
have certainly told his people more about his achievements and his way of doing 
things than he did. Political sklil of the men in power had less fascination for 
him than the ideas that were moving the world. H e wanted his country to lead 
a sensible and fair policy, warned against excessive nationalism and pleaded for 
justice to the urban poor and to the Germans. So little that is noteworthy is 
known about his activities as president that Elizabeth Whiskemann in her biogra-
phical story of him in the Encyclopedia Britannica chose — wrongly we believe — 
to end her story with his election to the presidency in 1918, adding simply that 
he was reelected in 1937 and 1934. 
Masaryk was an uncrowned head of the statě. His presidential function was 
O t á h a l o v a , Libuše / Č e r v i n k o v á , Milada (eds.): Dokumenty z historie 
československé politiky 1939—1943 [Documents on the History of Czechoslovak Poli­
tics 1939—1943]. Prague 1966, Vol. 1, p.280. 
„Almost all theoreticians and politicians seek to eliminate evil from modem society 
by economic and moral reforms. I have often found the problems of our politicians 
and economists rather silly. Securing a new prívilege here and there, or getting more 
money will not do away with the feeling of alienation. Who has redeemed humanity? 
Not a politician, economist, socialist or demagog . . . " M a s a r y k , T. G.: Selbst­
mord als soziale Massenerscheinung der Gegenwart. Vienna 1881. 
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primarily the work of Švehla and himself. Writing his New Europe in 1917 and 
1918 he was in favor of a strong president after the American fashion. As in 
all the other successor states so also in Czechoslovakia nothing was further from 
the people's mind in 1918 than to put great power into the hands of the presi­
dent or any other person. The power which was inherent in the people was 
vested in their representatives forming a national assembly, which in turn elected 
a committee, called the government of the country. It was therefore no disrespect 
of Masaryk when the provisional Constitution of November 1918 gave him only 
honoráry rights. From the first days of the new country, however, this kind of 
treatment of the „liberator" appeared incongruous to many, and so, as early as 
in May 1919 the provisional Constitution was amended giving the president grea-
ter powers. H e was empowered to nominate the ministers, consult them and pre-
side at their meetings without having the right to vote (He made use only twice 
of the last named prerogative during his turn of office)20. H e apparently wan-
ted still other powers, first of all he was in favor of populär election of the pre­
sident, giving him the right to appoint a number of Senators 21, and reducing the 
age of the presidential candidate to 35 years in order to ensure in that way 
election of Beneš in čase of his own death. Of these new rights only the last one 
was approved by the constitutional committee. It looks hat a year in Prague was 
enough for him to realize who was who in Czechoslovak politics and made him 
change his mind. We are told that prior to the adoption of the Constitution „Ma­
saryk regarded the building up the authority of the government as the most 
important task. Before the consideration of the presidential chapter in the Consti­
tution Švehla [the Spiritus movens of the constitutional committee, ed. note] paid 
a visit to the president. Masaryk was not anxious that the Constitution give the 
president great powers. He was not in favor of a strong president. He saw his 
model in the French president . . ,2 2." Švehla and all Czech politicians would have 
preferred to see the president govern, not to rule, to become a symbol of unity in 
a distracted, unorganized country. Above all they wanted him to stand above 
the parties. Švehla was afraid of the inborn propensity of Czech people to anarchy. 
He thought his people to be excentric „every coach in a tramcar appearing like 
a hornesťs nest, reather then a casual meeting of different people" 2 3. As one of 
the principál roles of the National Committee, which he formed in the turbulent 
months of May and June 1918 when Prague was on the verge of a premature 
revolution, was to become „a banner, visible to everybody, signifying to every 
soldier that he has a generál staff, and that the nation has a head of its own" 2 4. 
After the war Švehla transferred this role to the president. Kramář, the Czech 
2 0
 Č a p e k , Karel: President Masaryk Teils His Story. New York 1935, p. 157 (of the 
Czech text). 
2 1
 L i p s c h e r , Ladislav: Zur allgemeinen Analyse des politischen Mechanismus in der 
Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. In: Die „Burg". Einflußreiche politische Kräfte 
um Masaryk und Beneš. Vol. 1. Ed. Karl Bos l . Munich-Vienna 1973, p. 149. 
22
 P e r o u t k a 1498—1500. 
2 3
 H a j š m a n , Jan: Maffie v rozmachu [Mafia at its Height]. Prague 1933, p. 348. 
24
 I b i d e m 349. 
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leader in the Vienna Reichsrat, fully shared his fears as well as his conception of 
the role Masaryk was to play 2 S . For reasons of their own the social democrats, 
whose days were coming, betted on Masaryk, too 2 e. 
Masaryk was ambitious, but not power-hungry. To play the role of an English 
king, however, was not his meat. H e was not able to suppress in himself his in-
born, professional or professorial tendency to assign tasks, to criticize and to make 
himself heard now and then. His first encounter with the government took place 
as early as in the summer of 1919 when, on appointing the ministers of the first 
Tusar cabinet he added to each letter a shorter or longer advice what should be 
doně, as he ušed to give advice to students in writing their dissertation. Some 
ministers having raised objections to this proceduře, Švehla saw Masaryk and 
dissuaded him from repeating the performance2 7. Subsequently the nomination 
of a minister always consisted of a single sentence. A similar encounter of a slightly 
different kind took place in the early twenties. Unable to express himself publicly 
on political and even on other questions Masaryk took refuge to anonymity. He 
ušed to publish in Přítomnost, whose publication in 1923 he ensured by a sub-
stantial subsidy, as well as in other leftist papers. About a dozen of these articles 
were published after his death in the legionaires' periodical, Naše revoluce (Our 
Revolution). According to Peroutka „the prime minister's clear sight for Masa­
ryk's style uncovered the anonymity and led to another intervention" 2 S. 
These facts were known in the country by the knowledgable people. Salda and 
Nejedlý more than once wondered whether „the presidential office did not disarm 
the old warrior, and put on him shackles even harsher than were those of the 
Habsburgs" 2 9. Masaryk naturally was not a little aggravated by this limitation 
of his freedom. In one of his messages to the National Assembly he said: „With 
the help of the minister Švehla it has been possible to specialize the presidential 
2 5
 „We thank God for having you. but I implore you to remain above the clouds, for 
whoever in this country immerges himself into politics is likely to have mud thrown 
at him, and loses authority, which is so much needed." Kramar's words in welcoming 
Masaryk in Prague. 
2 6
 Until his death the social democrats regarded Masaryk as a non card-carrying member 
of their party, and Masaryk nevěr said nor did anything to dissuade them. In 1919 
he pleaded for socialization and did not stop when the socialist wave subsided. In his 
memoirs, published in 1925, he wrote: „I am in favor socialization of railroads, means 
of communication, water power, coal, etc." ( M a s a r y k , T. G.: Světová revoluce. 
Prague 1925, p. 539.) His social creed was expressed in three sentences: 1. Always in 
favor of the working people, 2. Very often hand in hand with the socialists, 3. Only 
rarely with the Marxists. Would he have approved of Benes's and Gottwalďs master 
stroke, their coup ď Etat of May 1945, installing a people's democratic regime in 
their country? He foresaw that eventuality in March 1920 when he said: „It is a great 
mistake to think that a socialistic revolution can be effected by subjugating the bour-
geoisie. Violence even in such a čase will not help. It would only create a class of 
slaves, and slaves nevěr work with pleasure and effectively." 
2 7
 P e r o u t k a , Ferdinand: Vůdce odchází [The Leader is Departing]. Přítomnost, De­
cember 18, 1935. 
2 8
 I b i d e m . 
2 9
 M a c h o v e c , Milan: Tomáš G. Masaryk. Prague 1968, p. 177. 
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function. Yet it is not clear enough, as may be seen from the current debatě about 
the constitutionality of this political Statement3 0." 
Much less was known about the muzzling of the president in the field of foreign 
relations, probably because of his readiness to defer to Beneš more than to any­
body eise. It should strike everybody that Masaryk, by his book, The Spirit of 
Russia, one of the first kremlinologs, who after the war often vehemently critici-
zed Lenin and the communists, after 1922, i. e. after the Genoa Conference, be­
came silent on this subject. The fact that the Czechs have nevěr heard Masaryk's 
view of Stalin may be safely put to the debit of Beneš. 
Today prewar Masaryk, the last „awakener" of his people, becomes even more 
important than president Masaryk. During the national subjection reminding of 
the presem one, he had the courage to teach his people positive thinking. He was 
not afraid to go up the stream and to urge his people to enter through the strait 
gate. He had the courage to publicly reject the cherished historical forgeries, which 
the nation for fifty years took for true, taught his people self-criticism, speak less 
about their wounds, and blame others for their failures, remain calm and sober. 
This was his realism. 
Should free Czechs decide to go in Masaryk's footsteps today, they would say 
with him that „greater moral courage is needed to recognize an error than to 
hold an error, cherished by the whole nation". They would then discover their 
modem historical forgeries in the traditional version of the events of the Beneš 
era, beginning in 1935 and ending in 1948, en era of Benes's socalled „political" 
t ruths 3 1 with which he had for years treated his people, embellishing in this way 
after 1922 his questionable, and during the war nefarious domestic and external 
policies. Other nations, too, small as well as great powers, had at times ill-advised 
periods in their history. Czech people had given a good account of themselves 
in the twenties, when their kind of response to the social and minority problems 
was rightly appreciated by the whole western world, and their country became 
known as an „island of democracy in central Europe". Their ill-advised historical 
era is indissolubly linked up to the person and policy of their second president, 
who between 1935 and 1945 more effectively controlled the course of national 
policy and exercised greater power then his great predecessor. His wordš and 
deeds, especially his blind orientation of the country on Soviet Russia and his 
Národní shromáždění republiky československé v prvním desítiletí [The National 
Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in the First Decade]. Prague 1928. 
About Benes's distinction between political and absolute truths see H e r b e n , Ivan: 
Beneš About His Visit to Roosevelt and About Munich. — F e i e r a b e n d , L.K.: 
Beneš mezi Washingtonem a Moskvou [Beneš Between Washington and Moscow]. 
Washington 1966, p. 134. An example of his double-talk is the statement he made to 
the Czech communists during his Moscow visit in December 1943: „About the premiér 
Sřámek Beneš said that he made him prime minister in order to assuage the British 
and the western world, saying: I am for them red cloth, and therefore I have put for-
ward (Msgr.) Šrámek as black cloth." Šrámek in London played the same role that 
later Fierlinger played in Czechoslovakia. K l i m e š , Miloš (ed.): Cesta ke Květnu 
[Road to May]. Prague 1965, p. 48. 
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trust in the Czech communists both beforeS 2 and during the war, leading to two 
catastrophic dénouements, make him appear like a double-crossed and humiliated 
Czech Lenin, whom he had resembled both by his messianism and perfidy3 3. They 
would then have to unitě in publicly condemning his policy before and during 
the war, repudiate his messianism, shared after the war by a considerable part 
of the Czech intelligentsia, and having doně this penance, return to the traditions 
of the liquidated First Republic, to its coalition cabinets, led by Švehla with Ma­
saryk, its standard-bearer. This might evenraally become a good starting point 
of a new life when their country one day will regain its freedom, and in the mean-
while a fitting memoriál of a fine piece of work, auspiciously begun by a group 
of humble and modest men, whose name and achievements are poorly known, and 
then wantonly destroyed by ill-advised decisions of a presumptious political and 
intellectual adventurer, their successor. 
Š V E H L A , B E N E Š U N D M A S A R Y K 
Der Verfasser befaßt sich mit der Führung der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen 
Republik und im Gegensatz zur allgemeinen Auffassung betrachtet er Švehla, 
mehr als Masaryk, als den führenden Kopf der tschechischen Politik vor der Ära 
Benešs und als Urheber der tschechoslowakischen Demokratie. 
Er ist der Meinung, daß tschechische Exulanten seit dem letzten Krieg einen 
Großteil ihrer Bewunderung für Beneš verloren haben; zweifellos deswegen, weil 
sie sich nicht vorstellen können, daß Masaryk Benešs Kriegs- und Nachkriegspolitik 
gebilligt hätte. Er findet, daß es zwei verschiedene Verhaltensweisen von Beneš 
gab. In den ersten Nachkriegsjahren folgte Beneš dem Rat seiner westlichen Freunde, 
freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu seinen Nachbarländern herzustellen. Dadurch ge­
wann er zu Recht den Ruf eines liberalen Staatsmannes. 
Bereits 1922 jedoch hatte er die Vorstellung, daß Rußland an Europa herange­
bracht werden sollte, und daß westeuropäische Mächte das, was er die Herrschaft 
des vierten Standes nannte, begünstigen sollten. Von diesem Zeitpunkt an ver­
suchte er sich bei Rußland beliebt zu machen und die Rolle des Vermittlers zu 
„Beneš says that he always made propaganda for the Soviet Union. He also had a 
clearer view of the communists than for example the coalition. But he could not carry 
out a policy of ten percent of the country's communistic population." K l i m e š 52. 
Dr. Beneš regarded all his former colleagues, ministers of a respectable, democratic 
country either as traitors or persons unworthy to hold office in his liberated country. 
The chief weakness of the First Republic, indeed, was that its political leaders in de-
fercnce to Masaryk's wishes permitted dr. Beneš — a cuckoo's egg in their own nest, 
an Outsider in Czech politics, who held in contempt their way of doing things — to 
hold permanently a very important office until he became irremovable, and later as 
president played a dominant role in determining both the foreign and internal policy 
of the country. Unlike Lenin's, however, his own revolution soon became half-heartcd, 
as may be gathered from the fears and premonitions he had expressed when talking to 
Ivan Herben in August 1945. But he was too latě to recognize his mistake, and in the 
end not strong enough to bring to a halt the pernicious forces, which he himself more 
than anybody eise had set in motion years before. 
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spielen. Seine Einmischung in die Politik der Großmächte wurde sein verhängnis-
voller Fehler, denn Rußland verfolgte immer seine eigenen Interessen und so 
wurde Beneš in Wirklichkeit, sowohl 1938 wie während des Krieges, von Stalin 
zum Narren gehalten. 
Verglichen mit der dominierenden Rolle, die Švehla im ersten Jahrzehnt in der 
Innenpolitik seines Landes spielte, und verglichen mit Benešs Rolle in der Außen-
politik der Zwischenkriegszeit sowie in der Innenpolitik, nachdem er Präsident ge-
worden war, war Masaryks Rolle viel bescheidener. Er wurde das ungekrönte 
Staatsoberhaupt entsprechend seiner ausgesprochen westlichen sowie sozialisti-
schen Orientierung. Er griff selten in die Innenpolitik ein und gab meistens dem 
Druck der radikalen „Burg"-Gruppe nach, indem er Benešs Zielen diente. Er 
drängte sein Land, eine faire und vernünftige Politik zu verfolgen und für das 
Städteproletariat sowie die Deutschen Verständnis aufzubringen. 
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